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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Admiralty law is considered one of the most complex 
areas of American law. See 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 
Admiralty & Maritime Law, S 1-1, at 2 (2d ed. 1994). In an 
earlier appeal in this matter, the United States Supreme 
Court held that Lucien and Robin Calhoun ("the Calhouns") 
may assert a cause of action based upon a state wrongful 
death or survival statute to obtain relief for the death of a 
non-seaman killed in United States territorial waters. See 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 216 
(1996). We are now asked to resolve some of the problems 
arising from the Supreme Court's holding -- problems that 
the Court itself recognized -- by ruling upon two distinct 
questions that the Court expressly declined to decide. 
 
In particular, we must determine (1) which state's law 
governs the type of damages available, and (2) whether 
state or federal law governs the standards by which the 
liability of appellees Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. and 
Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. will be defined. As a result, 
this appeal concerns the extent to which state law may co- 
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exist in the admiralty arena that historically has been the 
exclusive domain of federal legislative and regulatory 
entities. See generally David R. Lapp, Note, Admiralty & 
Federalism in the Wake of Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. 
Calhoun: Is Yamaha a Cry by the Judiciary for Legislative 
Action in State Territorial Waters?, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
677 (2000). 
 
With regard to damages, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the law of 
Pennsylvania would govern the issue of compensatory 
damages and that the law of Puerto Rico would govern that 
of punitive damages. The District Court further held that 
the law of Puerto Rico would govern the issue of Yamaha's 
liability. We will affirm in part and reverse in part, affirming 
the District Court's holding with respect to damages (both 
compensatory and punitive), yet reversing the District 
Court's disposition concerning liability, holding instead that 
federal maritime law must govern the standards by which 
Yamaha's liability will be evaluated. 
 
I 
 
In July 1989, Natalie Calhoun ("Natalie"), then twelve 
years old, traveled to Puerto Rico with her parents' 
permission to vacation with a friend and that friend's 
family. Tragically, however, on July 6, 1989, Natalie died 
when the Yamaha1 "WaveJammer"2 she was operating in 
the water bordering the resort at which she was staying 
struck an anchored vessel. The Calhouns, as Pennsylvania 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We will refer to both Yamaha entities that are the subject of this 
action collectively as "Yamaha." Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. is the 
manufacturing arm of the corporation, and is both incorporated and has 
its principal place of business in Japan. Yamaha Motor Corporation, 
U.S.A., is the distributing arm of the corporation, and is both 
incorporated and has its principal place of business in California. 
 
2. Although Yamaha apparently no longer manufactures the 
"WaveJammer," both this Court and the Supreme Court previously have 
described the vehicle as a class of jet ski. See Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202 (1996); Calhoun v. Yahama Motor 
Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622, 624 (3d Cir. 1994). At oral argument, counsel 
for the Calhouns referred to the WaveJammer as a"watertoy." 
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residents, filed the present action against Yamaha on June 
27, 1990, seeking relief pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
wrongful death and survival statutes, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. SS 8301-8302 (West 1995). The Calhouns' complaint, 
which alleged defects in the WaveJammer, is grounded in 
theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose. The complaint seeks both compensatory and 
punitive damages. Because the law of Puerto Rico does not 
allow a plaintiff to recover punitive damages, the Calhouns 
asserted that all questions concerning the appropriate form 
of remedy be governed by the law of Pennsylvania. For the 
same reason, on the other hand, Yamaha argued for the 
application of the law of Puerto Rico for resolution of all 
damages issues. 
 
Yamaha filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
November 27, 1991, alleging that because Natalie died in 
United States territorial waters,3 federal maritime law 
provided the Calhouns' sole remedy for the circumstances 
surrounding Natalie's death.4 The District Court granted 
Yamaha's motion in part, and dismissed that portion of the 
Calhouns' complaint that sought punitive damages and the 
loss of future earnings. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U.S.A., No. CIV. A. 90-4295, 1993 WL 216238, at *12 (E.D. 
Pa. June 22, 1993). After the Calhouns took an 
interlocutory appeal, we affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. See Calhoun v. Yahama Motor Corp., U.S.A. , 40 F.3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The term "territorial waters" refers to"all inland waters, all waters 
between line of mean high tide and line of ordinary law water, and all 
waters seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the coast 
line." Black's Law Dictionary 1473 (6th ed. 1990); see also Calhoun, 40 
F.3d at 624 (quoting William C. Brown, III, Problems Arising from the 
Intersection of Traditional Maritime Law and Aviation Death and Personal 
Injury Liability, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 577, 581 (1994)). The parties do not 
dispute that Natalie's death occurred in the territorial waters 
surrounding the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
 
4. As we discuss infra, the Calhouns opposed the application of federal 
maritime law to the substantive liability issues presented in the 
litigation 
because as opposed to the law of Pennsylvania, federal maritime law 
would allow Yamaha to introduce evidence of Natalie's negligence. See 
infra n.16. 
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622 (3d Cir. 1994). We concluded that although the 
Supreme Court, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 
398 U.S. 375 (1970), had eliminated the use of state law 
causes of action for deaths of seamen in territorial waters, 
state causes of action still remained available as relief for 
the death of non-seamen in territorial waters. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. 
Calhoun, 514 U.S. 1126 (1995), and affirmed in an 
unanimous opinion. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. 
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
 
Neither the original panel of this Court nor the Supreme 
Court, however, answered the questions that emerged from 
their respective holdings. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 
n.14; Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 644-45. First , if the Calhouns 
could utilize Pennsylvania's wrongful death or survival 
statute to obtain relief for Natalie's death, which law5 -- 
Pennsylvania's or Puerto Rico's -- governs the form of the 
remedy (or remedies) available to the Calhouns? Second, 
even understanding that Pennsylvania's wrongful death or 
survival statute provides the vehicle through which this 
action may proceed, does federal maritime law or state law 
provide the standards by which Yamaha's substantive 
liability will be determined? If the answer to this latter 
question is state law, will such liability standards be 
derived from the law of Pennsylvania or Puerto Rico? 
 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court 
issued a preliminary ruling on the first of these questions 
during a hearing held on September 23, 1998, a ruling that 
the District Court finalized in an opinion and order filed on 
March 22, 1999. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U.S.A., 40 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Specifically, the 
District Court held that because the present action"sounds 
in admiralty," federal choice-of-law rules6 would be 
employed to determine whether Pennsylvania or Puerto 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although Puerto Rico is technically classified as a "commonwealth" 
and not a "state," we, as did the District Court, will use the term "state 
law" to describe the law of both Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico. 
 
6. As we discuss in detail infra, federal choice-of-law analysis in the 
admiralty arena is governed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Lauritzen 
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). See infra  Part III-B. 
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Rico's law on damages would govern the present action. 
Invoking the doctrine of depecage,7 the District Court held 
that Pennsylvania law would govern the Calhouns' claim for 
compensatory damages and the law of Puerto Rico would 
govern their claim for punitive damages. Insofar as the law 
of Puerto Rico did not provide for the recovery of punitive 
damages, the District Court granted partial summary 
judgment in favor of Yamaha and dismissed that portion of 
the Calhouns' complaint that sought punitive damages. As 
for the second issue, the District Court determined that 
state law would govern the standards of liability, and, more 
specifically, that the law of Puerto Rico would be the source 
of such standards. 
 
The District Court again certified these issues to this 
Court through an interlocutory order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(b). On April 12, 1999, we permitted the Calhouns to 
take this appeal. 
 
II 
 
The District Court's order requires us to address and 
answer three different questions: 
 
       1. Did [the District Court] err in deciding,  on remand, 
       that partial summary judgment should be granted to 
       Yamaha, precluding any claim by the Calhouns for 
       punitive damages, on the ground that (a) the 
       availability of punitive damages should be determined 
       by the remedial law of Puerto Rico, the situs of the 
       tragic accident giving rise to the suit, and (b) the law of 
       remedies of Puerto Rico makes no provision for 
       punitive damages? 
 
       2. Did [the District Court] err in deciding,  on remand, 
       that the Calhouns' entitlement to seek particular 
       categories of compensatory damages should be 
       determined by the law of remedies of Pennsylvania, the 
       state of residence of Lucien and Robin Calhoun and of 
       their daughter Natalie, rather than by the law of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "Depecage" refers to the use of the law of different states to resolve 
different issues in the same case. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 
F.3d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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       remedies of Puerto Rico, the situs of Natalie's fatal 
       accident, and hence that Yamaha's motion for partial 
       summary judgment should be denied insofar as it 
       sought to preclude the Calhouns from seeking 
       compensatory damages in conformity with the law of 
       remedies of Pennsylvania? 
 
       3. Did [the District Court] err in deciding,  on remand, 
       that the jurisdiction whose substantive liability law is 
       the source of the Calhouns' claims is Puerto Rico? 
 
Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 295-96. 
 
III 
 
We turn first to the questions concerning damages. In 
issuing its ruling, the District Court reached three separate 
conclusions: (1) because the action instituted by the 
Calhouns concerned a death occurring in the "navigable 
waters" of the United States, the action "sound[ed] in 
admiralty," and therefore implicated federal choice-of-law 
rules; (2) given the differing (yet significant) interests of 
both Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico in the proper mode of 
recovery in this matter, the use of the depecage doctrine 
was appropriate; and (3) because Pennsylvania has a 
stronger interest in providing compensation for its citizens, 
Pennsylvania's law would govern as to compensatory 
damages, and because Puerto Rico has a stronger interest 
in punishing Yamaha for tortious acts occurring in its 
territorial waters, Puerto Rico's law would govern on 
punitive damages. The significance of the District Court's 
punitive damage ruling is that the law of Puerto Rico does 
not allow for the recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful 
death or survival action.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court's interlocutory order also inquires if it erred with 
respect to its more substantive holding that law of Puerto Rico would not 
provide the Calhouns with the opportunity for punitive damages on the 
facts presented in their complaint. We hold that the District Court did 
not err, and therefore answer this portion of the interlocutory order in 
the negative. See, e.g., Barreto v. Citibank, N.A., 907 F.2d 15, 15 (1st 
Cir. 
1990); Shelley v. Trafalgar House Public Ltd. , 977 F. Supp. 95, 96 & n.1 
(D.P.R. 1997); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 
79, 84 (D.P.R. 1990). 
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A 
 
We must first address a threshold question: do federal 
choice-of-law rules govern the Calhouns' damage claims? 
The appropriate choice-of-law rules to be applied is 
controlled by the basis for our federal jurisdiction, or power 
to adjudicate the Calhouns' claims. See Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). It is 
axiomatic that a federal court sitting in diversity must 
apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. 
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496- 
97 (1941); see also Assicerazoni General, S.P.A. v. Clover, 
195 F.3d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 1999). As such, if our 
jurisdiction were to be based upon diversity principles, the 
District Court would be bound to apply Pennsylvania 
choice-of-law rules insofar as the Calhouns instituted their 
action against Yamaha in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. If, however, our jurisdiction were to be 
grounded in admiralty, federal choice-of-law principles, first 
identified in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), 
would apply. See, e.g., Aqua-Marine Constructors, Inc. v. 
Banks, 110 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, 
Polaris Ins. Co. v. Aqua-Marine Constructors, Inc. , 522 U.S. 
933 (1997); Complaint of Kreta Shipping, S.A. , 1 F. Supp. 2d 
282, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); AGIP Petroleum Co. v. Gulf 
Island Fabrication, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (S.D. Tex. 
1996). 
 
The Calhouns initially averred that the District Court 
properly could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over 
their claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1333, which provides 
the federal courts with jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil case of 
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all 
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise 
entitled." 28 U.S.C. S 1333(1).9  See Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 626 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In this initial appeal, the panel determined that the District Court 
could have exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the Calhouns' 
action pursuant to the admiralty provision of section 1333. The Supreme 
Court issued a similar statement in its opinion. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. 
at 206. Insofar as this determination was not necessary to either court's 
ultimate holding, however, it properly is classified as dictum. It 
therefore 
does not possess a binding effect on us pursuant to the "law of the case" 
doctrine. See, e.g., In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717 (3d 
Cir. 
1998); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. , 988 F.2d 414, 429 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). 
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n.5. In an attempt to ensure the use of Pennsylvania's 
wrongful death and survival statutes, however, the 
Calhouns quickly withdrew from this position. Indeed, given 
the fact that the accident giving rise to this action involved 
the operation of a recreational -- as opposed to a 
commercial -- water vehicle, see Ex Parte Easton, 95 U.S. 
68, 72-73 (1877), an application of admiralty jurisdiction 
would appear -- at first blush -- misplaced here. The 
Supreme Court's previous holding, authorizing the 
Calhouns' use of a state law remedy to obtain damages as 
relief for Natalie's death, see Calhoun, 516 U.S. at 216, 
further suggests that the present matter falls outside of our 
admiralty jurisdiction. 
 
Before 1972, the Supreme Court adhered to what was 
known as the "locality test," which authorized the exercise 
of admiralty jurisdiction in all matters in which the incident 
giving rise to the cause of action occurred on the navigable 
waters of the United States. See, e.g., Victory Carriers, Inc. 
v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 n.2 (1971); The Plymouth, 70 
U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35 (1865). In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. 
v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), however, the 
Court abandoned the use of the locality test in a case 
concerning an airplane that crashed into Lake Erie shortly 
after takeoff. See id. at 250, 261. The Court replaced the 
locality test with an analysis that required a court to 
determine whether the incident in question bore a 
"significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. 
at 268. Holding that an airplane crash did not bear such a 
relationship to traditional maritime activity, the Court held 
that the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction was not 
appropriate. See id. 
 
The Court further explained the Executive Jet  standard in 
Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. 668 (1982). In 
Richardson, two boats that were being used for recreational 
purposes -- but had never been utilized for commercial 
purposes -- had collided on the Amite River in Louisiana. 
See id. at 669. Notwithstanding the lack of any nexus to 
commercial activity, and citing the need for uniform rules of 
conduct and the fact that a pleasure boat collision could 
potentially impact maritime commerce, the Court held that 
"the negligent operation of a vessel on navigable waters . . . 
 
                                9 
  
ha[d] a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity to 
sustain admiralty jurisdiction." Id. at 674-75.10 In so 
holding, the Court stated that the incident giving rise to the 
claim in question must have some impact on maritime 
commerce to support admiralty jurisdiction, but that the 
collision of two pleasure boats satisfied such a requirement. 
See id. at 675. 
 
The Court reemphasized these principles in Sisson v. 
Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990), where the Court held that 
admiralty jurisdiction was available to adjudicate a cause of 
action concerning a fire that started on board a pleasure 
yacht, and proceeded to damage several other boats as well 
as the marina at which the owner docked the yacht. See id. 
at 360. Indeed, the Court held that "the need for uniform 
rules of maritime conduct and liability is not limited to 
navigation, but extends at least to any other activities 
traditionally undertaken by vessels, commercial or 
noncommercial." Id. at 367 (emphasis added). 
 
Turning to the present appeal, the Yamaha WaveJammer 
that Natalie was operating at the time of her death is a type 
of pleasure craft that is almost exclusively used for 
recreational purposes. Nevertheless, the Court's recent 
jurisprudence -- namely, Richardson and Sisson -- 
indicates that so long as the incident in question, and the 
vehicles utilized therein, bears some relation to traditional 
maritime activity and could, in any way, impact upon the 
flow of maritime commerce, admiralty jurisdiction is proper. 
See generally 1 U.S.C. S 3 ("The word`vessel' includes every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance use, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although it announced a rule that appeared to sanction the 
expanded use of admiralty jurisdiction, the Court cautioned that "[n]ot 
every accident in navigable waters that might disrupt maritime 
commerce will support admiralty jurisdiction." Id. at 675 n.5. In this 
vein, the Court cited its opinion in Executive Jet, arguing that although 
an airplane crash in navigable waters might interfere with maritime 
commerce, such an accident did not possess the requisite connection to 
traditional maritime activity. See id. We, however, have recently 
suggested that admiralty jurisdiction would extend even to a simple slip 
and fall that occurred on a cruise line. See Fedorczyk v. Caribbean 
Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on 
water." (emphasis added)). 
 
Further, much like the collision at issue in Richardson, 
the collision between the two vessels in the instant matter 
bears some impact, however remote, on maritime 
commerce. In particular, the vessel that Natalie struck 
could have been a commercial boat, or the ensuing 
investigation into the crash could have made commercial 
navigation in and around the marina difficult. 11 Indeed, the 
accident at issue here is virtually identical to the accident 
that occurred in Richardson, and as such, we hold that we 
properly exercise jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
the admiralty provisions of 28 U.S.C. S 1333(1). We are 
therefore satisfied that the District Court was correct in 
applying federal choice-of-law principles in determining 
which law on damages should be applied to this case. 12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Court has continuously directed that in examining an incident's 
nexus to maritime commerce for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, 
a court must look not only to the specific impact that the particular 
incident had on such commerce, but to "the potential impact of [the] 
incident by examining its general character." Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363. 
For instance, the Richardson Court determined that although the 
collision of those particular pleasure boats in the Amite River did not 
threaten maritime commerce, if the same collision were to have occurred 
in the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, the impact on maritime 
commerce would have been serious. See Richardson , 457 U.S. at 675. 
This latter conclusion, the Court held, provided the District Court with 
admiralty jurisdiction. See id. 
 
12. We also hold that the District Court did not err in employing the 
doctrine known as "depecage." The Calhouns strongly argue against the 
application of this doctrine, offering as support our opinion in Broome v. 
Antlers' Hunting Club, 595 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1979). In Broome, sitting in 
diversity, we predicted that although the Pennsylvania courts had yet to 
issue a definitive opinion either approving or disfavoring the use of 
depecage, the Pennsylvania courts would likely approve the use of the 
doctrine. See id. at 923-24. Nevertheless, as we are obliged to apply 
federal choice-of-law principles, Broome is inapposite. We note that a 
number of district courts within this circuit have utilized depecage, see, 
e.g., City of Rome v. Glanton, 958 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1996); 
Chemetron Investments v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 886 F. Supp. 1194, 
1199 (W.D. Pa. 1994), and that the doctrine has obtained support in our 
sister circuits. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 
848 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Continental Airlines Corp., 964 F.2d 
1059, 1062 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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B 
 
Federal choice-of-law rules in the admiralty arena are 
governed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Lauritzen v. 
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1964). In Lauritzen , the Court held 
that 
 
       Maritime law, like our municipal law, has attempted to 
       avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by 
       ascertaining and valuing points of conflict between 
       contact between the transaction and the states or 
       government between the transaction regulated and the 
       states or governments whose competing laws are 
       involved. The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived 
       at from weighing of the significance of one or more 
       connecting factors between the shipping transaction 
       regulated and the national interest served by the 
       assertion of authority. 
 
Id. at 582. 
 
The Court identified seven factors for courts to weigh in 
rendering choice-of-law decisions: place of the wrongful act, 
law of the flag, allegiance or domicile of the injured, 
allegiance of the defendant shipowner, place of contract, 
inaccessibility of a foreign forum, and the law of the forum. 
See id. at 583-91. Many of these factors (e.g., law of the 
flag, allegiance of the defendant shipowner, and 
inaccessibility of a foreign forum), however, do not apply to 
the present dispute, which concerns entirely domestic 
interests. 
 
Lauritzen itself involved a choice between the law of the 
United States and that of Denmark, see id. at 573-74, and, 
indeed, the Lauritzen factors are most often applied to 
determine whether the admiralty law of the United States or 
that of a foreign state should be applied to a particular 
dispute. See, e.g., Carbotrade S.p.A. v. Bureau Veritas, 99 
F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996); Zacaria v. Gulf King 35, Inc., 31 
F. Supp. 2d 560, 563 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The Lauritzen Court 
recognized this focus on international disputes. See 
Zacaria, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 563 ("Generally, the law of the 
flag and the defendant shipowner's base of operations 
weigh most heavily in the determination." (citing Lauritzen, 
345 U.S. at 583)). 
 
                                12 
  
Nevertheless, we had the opportunity to apply the 
Lauritzen analysis to a purely domestic tort action in Scott 
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968). In 
Scott, an airplane bound for Atlanta -- with a layover in 
Philadelphia -- took off from Logan Airport in Boston only 
to crash into Boston Harbor shortly thereafter. See id. at 
18-19. The survivors of one of the passengers on board that 
flight sued the airline in both tort and contract, and we 
determined, with respect to the tort issues, that the 
Lauritzen factors would govern whether Massachusetts or 
Pennsylvania law would apply. See id. at 25. We determined 
that the Lauritzen factors, viewed as a whole, represented a 
departure from the application -- in admiralty cases -- of 
the lex loci delecti13 rule and a move toward analyzing which 
state had the most significant relationship to the incident 
and the dominant interest in having its law applied. 14 See 
id. at 28-29. 
 
We held that because the crash that occurred in Boston 
Harbor was purely fortuitous or adventitious, 
Massachusetts had a very limited relationship to the 
accident that gave rise to the cause of action and therefore 
had little interest in having its law applied. See id. at 28. 
On the other hand, because Pennsylvania was the 
decedent's domicile, the situs of his ticket purchase, and 
the administration of his estate, Pennsylvania had the most 
significant relationship to the action, as well as the 
dominant interest in having its law applied. See id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The lex loci delecti doctrine requires courts to apply the law of the 
state in which the tort occurred. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 
A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964). 
 
14. The "most significant relationship" analysis is that which has been 
advocated by the American Law Institute's Second Restatement on 
Conflicts of Law. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law S 145 
(1971). As we explained in Scott, the Restatement itself had cited 
Lauritzen as an example of the "most significant relationship" standard. 
See Scott, 399 F.2d at 28 n.9 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws, S 145 Reporter's Note at 20 (Proposed Official Draft, Part II, 
1971)). The Second Restatement includes, as a relevant part of this 
analysis, an inquiry into which state has the dominant interest in having 
its law applied. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law S 145 cmt. 
b. 
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The Calhouns argue that because Natalie did not intend 
for the WaveJammer she was operating to lose control, the 
fact that she was killed in Puerto Rico was just as 
fortuitous as the incident that occurred in Scott, and that 
therefore Puerto Rico has little, if any, relationship to the 
accident and little interest in having its law applied. We 
disagree. If we were to accept the Calhouns' interpretation 
of the Scott court's concept of fortuity, virtually every 
accidental injury would qualify as "fortuitous," thus diluting 
to the point of extinction any application of the law of the 
state in which an injury or death occurred. Although we 
agree that the Supreme Court has expressed a dislike for a 
rote application of the lex loci delecti doctrine, we believe 
that the Court intended a rule that balanced, rather than 
displaced, the various states' interests. 
 
The airplane in Scott could have crashed anywhere -- 
Boston Harbor, the Hudson River, or Long Island Sound -- 
it was merely chance that the plane went down in the 
territorial waters off the coast of Massachusetts, as opposed 
to, for instance, New York or New Jersey. Here, however, 
Natalie intentionally traveled to Puerto Rico and 
intentionally operated the WaveJammer in Puerto Rico's 
territorial waters. This being so, there was no  possibility 
that Natalie's accident could have occurred anywhere other 
than in Puerto Rico. 
 
Courts within this Circuit have held that the concept of 
"fortuitous injury" cannot be invoked in an effort to avoid 
application of the law of state in which the injury occurred 
when the injured (or deceased) intentionally traveled to the 
location of the accident. See, e.g., Tonkon v. Denny's, Inc., 
650 F. Supp. 119, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("When a party 
voluntarily and intentionally travels to another state, the 
location of an injury incurred there is not fortuitous." 
(citing Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 
1986)). We have held that once a court classifies an activity 
or accident as non-fortuitous in nature," `the place of the 
injury assumes much more importance, and in some 
instances may be determinative.' " LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, 
Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Shuder v. 
McDonald's Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 1988)); 
Shields v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 397, 401 (3d 
Cir. 1987)). 
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Here, as we have related, Natalie voluntarily traveled to 
Puerto Rico and boarded, as well as operated, the 
WaveJammer that ultimately caused her death. The sole 
relationship that Pennsylvania enjoys with this incident is 
that the Calhouns -- and Natalie prior to her death -- were 
Pennsylvania domicilliaries, as well as the fact that 
Natalie's estate will be administered in Pennsylvania. 
Although these ties are certainly relevant, they do not 
outweigh the more prominent relationship that Puerto Rico, 
as the situs of the injury, has with this litigation. These 
principles therefore counsel in favor of the application of 
the law of Puerto Rico on the issue of both compensatory 
and punitive damages. 
 
As stated above, however, we must also inquire into 
which state has the most dominant interest in having its 
law applied to this litigation. Viewed in this manner, and 
through the lens of the depecage doctrine, both 
Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico each have significant 
interests in having its respective law applied to the different 
types of damages that the Calhouns seek through their 
complaint. 
 
The purpose of compensatory damages is "to make the 
plaintiff whole." Feingold v. SEPTA, 517 A.2d 1270, 1276 
(Pa. 1986); see also Saldana Sanchez v. Vega Sosa, 175 
F.3d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 1999). Given that the individuals who 
seek to be made whole -- the Calhouns and Natalie's estate 
-- are all Pennsylvania domicilliaries, it appears as if 
Pennsylvania has a strong interest in having its law of 
compensatory damages apply to the present matter. 
Further, it is hard to dispute that Pennsylvania has a 
substantial interest in obtaining compensation for its 
citizens in order to remedy wrongs that have been 
committed against such individuals. See, e.g. , Blakesley, 
789 F.2d at 242 n.11. That interest, however, does not 
obtain insofar as Puerto Rico is concerned, as the Calhouns 
have virtually no connection to Puerto Rico. Accordingly, 
Puerto Rico would have very little interest in either making 
the Calhouns whole or remedying wrongs that Yamaha may 
have committed against them. 
 
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are intended to 
punish wrongdoers and deter future conduct. See, e.g., 
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Kirkbride v. Lishon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 
1989); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages 
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale 
L.J. 2071, 2081 (1999) (quoting a jury instruction regarding 
punitive damages as stating "the purpose of such an award 
is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter that wrongdoer 
from repeating such wrongful acts"). Although Pennsylvania 
has an interest in punishing those who harm their citizens, 
we are persuaded that Puerto Rico's interest in regulating 
the activity that occurs in its territorial waters-- whether 
commercial or recreational -- is more dominant. Indeed, 
the tragic death that befell Natalie easily could have been 
visited upon a Puerto Rican citizen. Cf. Puerto Rico Act No. 
48 (1986) ("The State . . . must be watchful for the owners 
of vessels, sailors, and water skiers to also be prudent in 
their enjoyment and practice of their recreational activities, 
for their benefit and that of the bathers."). Puerto Rico also 
has an especially strong interest in maintaining the safety 
of the waterways surrounding the island to preserve the 
economic benefits it derives from both tourism and other 
commercial enterprises.15 
 
As a result, we hold that the District Court did not err in 
ruling that it would apply the law of Pennsylvania in the 
determination of compensatory damages and the law of 
Puerto Rico in the determination of punitive damages. 
 
IV 
 
The District Court also ruled that state law -- 
specifically, the law of Puerto Rico -- would be applied in 
order to determine whether Yamaha was substantively 
liable for Natalie's death. As earlier noted, the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Calhouns argue that Puerto Rico cannot have a dominant 
interest in the application of its law on punitive damages because Puerto 
Rico has rejected the use of punitive damages as a deterrent measure. 
Such an argument, however, miscomprehends the nature of our inquiry. 
The appropriate question is not whether Puerto Rico's specific interest in 
the application of its law on punitive damages is dominant as compared 
to Pennsylvania's, but rather, whether the state in which the injury 
occurred has a dominant interest in the application of its law on punitive 
damages as compared to the state of the plaintiff 's domicile. 
 
                                16 
  
Court's interlocutory order asked us to answer the 
following: 
 
       3. Did [the District Court] err in deciding,  on remand, 
       that the jurisdiction whose substantive liability law is 
       the source of the Calhouns' claims is Puerto Rico? 
 
Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 298.16  We hold that the answer 
given by the District Court, that the law of Puerto Rico 
would govern, was erroneous. Our holding to this effect 
obliges us to reverse that part of the District Court's order. 
 
The answer to the District Court's question revolves 
around the proper interpretation of a number of Supreme 
Court opinions concluding with the Court's opinion in the 
instant matter. Prior to 1970, actions for wrongful death in 
admiralty were governed by the Supreme Court's decision, 
during the Court's 1886 term, in The Harrisburg , 119 U.S. 
199 (1886). In The Harrisburg, the Court held that because 
Congress had not seen fit to provide a cause of action for 
wrongful death in admiralty cases, it would be 
inappropriate for the federal courts to create such a cause 
of action from federal common law. See id. at 213. In so 
ruling, the Court stated that "[t]he rights of persons in this 
particular [action] under the maritime law of this country 
are not different from those under the common law, and [ ] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. This issue is more than a merely academic exercise. As counsel for 
the Calhouns indicated at oral argument, Pennsylvania law would bar 
any attempt by Yamaha, under a comparative negligence theory, to 
introduce evidence of Natalie's negligence in operating the WaveJammer 
in order to limit its own liability. See Fray v. Harley Davidson Motor 
Co., 
734 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ("The general rule [is] that 
contributory and comparative negligence are not defenses to a strict 
products liability action."), appeal denied , Nos. 924-926, 2000 WL 60053 
(Pa. Jan. 19, 2000); Jara v. Rexworks, Inc., 718 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998). On the other hand, a plaintiff 's comparative negligence 
is a proper defense to a cause of action sounding in admiralty. See 
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975) ("We 
hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to 
cause property damage . . . damages [are] to be allocated equally only 
when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to 
measure the comparative degree of their fault."); see also Farr v. NC 
Mach. Co., 186 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 1999); In re: Sinclair Navigation 
Corp., 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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it is the duty of courts to declare the law, not to make it." 
Id. at 213-14. The Court's holding in The Harrisburg 
therefore forced plaintiffs such as the Calhouns to rely 
exclusively upon state causes of action if they sought to 
obtain a remedy for an allegedly wrongful death in United 
States territorial waters. 
 
After The Harrisburg, a trilogy of Supreme Court opinions 
decided between 1959 and 1960 informed lower courts that 
when exercising their admiralty jurisdiction, they were 
required to apply state law completely -- with respect to 
both procedural and substantive issues. See Goett v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess v. United States, 
361 U.S. 314 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 
588 (1959). Representative of this trilogy was The Tungus v. 
Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), in which the Court held 
that 
 
       decisions of this Court long ago established that when 
       admiralty adopts a State's right of action for wrongful 
       death, it must enforce the right as an integrated whole, 
       with whatever conditions and limitations the creating 
       State has attached. 
 
Id. at 592. Importantly, the Court in The Tungus expressly 
based this language upon its holding in The Harrisburg. See 
id. Because no federal statute provided a cause of action for 
wrongful death in territorial waters, The Harrisburg and The 
Tungus suggested that courts entertaining such causes of 
action were to apply state law liability standards. Indeed, 
the Court explicitly held in Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 
314 (1960), that "in an action for wrongful death in state 
territorial waters, the conduct said to give rise to liability is 
to be measured not under admiralty's standards of action, 
but under the substantive standards of the state law." Id. 
at 319. 
 
This principle, through which the states remained a 
virtually equal participant in regulating the means by which 
an individual could obtain relief for another's death on the 
water, seemingly changed as a result of the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Moragne v. United Marine Lines, Inc., 398 
U.S. 375 (1970). In Moragne, the Court overruled The 
Harrisburg and created a federal cause of action under the 
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federal common law for wrongful death to provide a remedy 
for survivors of seamen killed in territorial waters. See id. 
at 409. Indeed, The Moragne Court stated that the rule 
adopted in The Harrisburg "had little justification except in 
primitive English legal history -- a history far removed from 
the American law of remedies for maritime deaths." Id. at 
379. 
 
The Moragne Court did not, however, expressly overrule 
the trilogy of The Tungus, Hess, and Goett. Rather, the 
Court stated that the genesis of the jurisprudential 
nightmare that resulted in the Court's holding in Moragne 
could be found in The Harrisburg, not The Tungus. See id. 
at 378 ("[W]e have concluded that the primary source of the 
confusion is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The 
Harrisburg . . . ."). Although the Court declined to overrule 
The Tungus expressly, we could argue, were it not for 
subsequent expressions of our Court and the Supreme 
Court itself, that with the demise of The Harrisburg, the 
Court similarly relegated, sub silentio, opinions such as The 
Tungus, Hess, and Goett to the jurisprudential scrapheap of 
history, insofar as such rulings were expressly based upon 
The Harrisburg. As the District Court recognized, this was 
also the position taken by most admiralty commentators 
prior to the institution of this litigation. See, e.g., 2 Richard 
Ziade, Benedict on Admiralty, S 81e, at 7-17 n. 59 (7th ed. 
1999); Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of 
Admiralty, S 6-32, at 367 (2d ed. 1975). 
 
The earlier opinions of both our Court and the Supreme 
Court in the Calhoun/Yamaha controversy to which we 
have previously referred, however, appear to imply 
otherwise. Indeed, in our previous Calhoun opinion, we 
observed that the portion of The Tungus that suggested that 
the ability of a non-seaman to obtain relief for injury or 
death occurring in state territorial waters depended on 
state statutory law "retain[ed] vitality post-Moragne." 
Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 641 n.39. The Supreme Court echoed 
our reasoning. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 212. The question 
therefore becomes whether these statements have revived 
the principle for which The Tungus has become most 
known -- a court hearing an action in which a party is 
using a state wrongful death statute to institute an action 
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in admiralty must apply state law to all issues presented. 
The District Court answered this question in the 
affirmative, reasoning that "in this Circuit, The Tungus, 
with all its Harrisburg-era warts, remains good law with 
respect to the proposition that `rights of non-seaman [sic] 
killed in state territorial waters depend on state wrongful 
death statute.' " Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 295. From this 
principle, the District Court extrapolated that"[t]he 
substantive rights of those suing derivatively from, or in the 
name of, nonseafarers killed in the territorial waters of a 
state have their source in state law." Id.  
 
We respectfully disagree. We believe that The Tungus 
remains good law only with respect to its broader 
proposition concerning the role that state regulation may 
play in the admiralty arena. The Supreme Court has lent 
credence to this broader proposition by authorizing the 
Calhouns' use of Pennsylvania's wrongful death/survival 
statute only as the vehicle through which they may 
prosecute their action. The more specific holding of The 
Tungus, however -- that federal courts must apply all facets 
of state law when a plaintiff seeks to proceed by way of a 
cause of action grounded in state law -- was effectively 
overruled in Moragne once the Court invalidated the 
reasoning advanced by the Court in The Harrisburg. The 
Tungus's emphasis on the usage of the particulars of state 
law was specifically trained on the fact that federal law 
(both statutory and common law) did not provide a cause of 
action for wrongful death on the water. This was the very 
precept that was universally struck down in Moragne, 
through which the Supreme Court created such a cause of 
action. As such, The Tungus's remaining vitality rests only 
upon the limited proposition announced by the Supreme 
Court earlier in this very litigation -- that state law may 
provide a procedure or a vehicle through which a plaintiff 
may institute an action to remedy death in territorial 
waters. 
 
The District Court's holding also failed to take account of 
the prevailing policy that has guided the advancement of 
federal admiralty law and regulation: uniformity. Creating a 
uniform system by which activities and events on the 
waters of the United States would be adjudicated was such 
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a matter of concern to the Framers that they placed 
admiralty as among the powers of the newly-created federal 
government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 10 (granting 
Congress the power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high seas"). The Supreme Court 
addressed the importance of uniformity in the maritime 
arena in Richardson: "The federal interest in protecting 
maritime commerce . . . can be fully vindicated only if all 
operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to 
uniform rules of conduct . . . ." Richardson , 457 U.S. at 
674-75; see also Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367 ("[T]he need for 
uniform rules of maritime conduct and liability is not 
limited to navigation, but expands at least to any other 
activities traditionally undertaken by vessels."). 
 
Uniformity, as Yamaha forcefully argues, is a rather 
strong concern in the instant matter. If we were to adopt 
the District Court's holding that the substantive standards 
by which an admiralty defendant's liability is adjudged is 
governed by the law of the state in which the alleged injury 
occurred, there would be no uniformity in such standards. 
Cf. Ellis v. Riverfront Enterprises, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 105, 
106 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (stating that " `[p]rinciples of federalism 
counsel that only when the federal interest in uniformity 
outweighs other interests at stake should admiralty 
jurisdiction deprive the state of its traditional control over 
personal injury claims.' "). Indeed, such uniformity 
concerns informed the Moragne Court's decision to overrule 
The Harrisburg. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 401 ("Our 
recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under 
general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of 
federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies 
that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state 
remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive 
concepts." (emphasis added)). 
 
Accordingly, we hold that federal maritime standards 
govern the adjudication of a defendant's (here, Yamaha's) 
putative liability in an admiralty action brought pursuant 
to a state wrongful death/survival statute.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We note that we are not alone in setting forth the above reasoning in 
the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in the instant matter. Indeed, 
the Southern District of New York has held that 
 
                                21 
  
V 
 
We conclude by summarizing our answers to the certified 
questions: 
 
       1. Should punitive damages be determined by the la w 
       of Puerto Rico? We have answered "yes," and in so 
       doing, we affirm the order of partial summary 
       judgment entered by the District Court on March 22, 
       1999. 
 
       2. Should compensatory damages be determined by 
       the law of Pennsylvania? We have answered "yes," and 
       in so doing, we affirm the order of partial summary 
       judgment entered by the District Court on March 22, 
       1999. 
 
       3. Is the law of Puerto Rico to be applied to dete rmine 
       the liability of Yamaha? We have answered "no," and in 
       so doing, we reverse this portion of the order entered 
       by the District Court on March 22, 1999, and remand 
       this matter to the District Court for further proceedings 
       consistent with this opinion. 
 
Each party will bear its own costs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       [t]he thrust of Yamaha [516 U.S. 199] is to argue that 
       considerations of uniformity in federal maritime wrongful death 
       action require only that standards of liability be exclusively 
       determined by federal maritime law and that, once such liability 
has 
       been shown, there is no antagonism to such a policy in 
       supplementing federal remedies with those available under 
       otherwise applicable state statutes. 
 
O'Hare v. Celebrity Cruise Lines, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). The O'Hare court termed any indication in Yamaha to the 
contrary as "Delphic." See id. at 256 n.1. 
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NYGAARD, J., concurring and dissenting. 
 
I take little issue with most of the majority's carefully 
crafted opinion. I do, however, respectfully part ways with 
its choice of Puerto Rican law, and conclusion that the 
Estate of Natalie K. Calhoun should be denied punitive 
damages. 
 
As the majority correctly points out, a federal court 
sitting in diversity applies the forum state's choice of law 
rules. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487 
(1941). This requires that we weigh the interests of the 
jurisdictions involved and consider how these interests are 
related to the specific issues involved in the conflict. See 
Laurtizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953). 
 
Contacts considered vital in determining the state of most 
significant relationship include: place of injury, place of 
conduct, domicile of the parties, and the place where the 
relationship between the parties is centered. See 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws S145(2) (1971). 
The importance of the respective contacts is determined, in 
part, by considering the issues, the nature of the tort, and 
the purposes of the tort rules involved. Id. at S 145 
(comments c-f). 
 
The District Court relied exclusively on the fact that 
Puerto Rico does not provide punitive damages as part of 
its damages scheme: 
 
       [The] purposes [of punitive damages] appear to be the 
       community purposes of the state or community in 
       which the tortious activity takes place. The fact that 
       Puerto Rico does not have a regime of punitive 
       damages reflects a community determination that 
       Puerto Rico for its reasons does not think that punitive 
       damages are the instrument . . . through which it 
       wishes to pursue . . . punishment on the one hand and 
       deterrence on the other. 
 
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 
(E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 
The District Court further opined that since the chief 
purposes of punitive damages are to deter and punish, 
rather than compensate the victims, the public policy of 
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Puerto Rico, a Commonwealth that has elected not to 
employ punitive damages as an instrument of deterrence 
and punishment, should govern as to this aspect of 
damages, instead of the public policy of Pennsylvania. See 
id.; see also Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp. , 1998 WL 
717430 (E.D. Pa. 1998). However, under the modern 
interest-analysis conflict of laws approach that is followed 
by the majority of states including Pennsylvania, the law of 
the state with the greatest interest in furthering the public 
policy behind its punitive damages scheme should govern. 
 
Puerto Rico has little interest in the outcome here. In 
contrast, Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery 
in wrongful death cases is great. The Constitution of 
Pennsylvania, Article III, Section 21 P.S. (cited in Griffith v. 
United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. 1964)) states: 
 
       The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the 
       payment by employers, or employers and employees 
       jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to 
       employees arising in the course of their employment 
       ***; but in no other cases shall the General Assembly 
       limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in 
       death, or for injuries to persons or property, and in case 
       of death from such injuries, the right of action shall 
       survive ***. (emphasis added). 
 
Punitive damages are appropriate in Pennsylvania when 
the act committed, in addition to causing actual damages, 
constitutes "outrageous conduct," either through reckless 
indifference or bad motive. See McClellan v. Health 
Maintenance Org. of Pennsylvania, 604 A.2d 1053, 1061 
(Pa. Super. 1992); see also Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 
747-48 (Pa. 1984). We have held that three factors should 
be considered when awarding punitive damages: (1) the 
character of the act; (2) the nature and extent of the harm 
caused; and (3) the wealth of the defendant. See Donaldson 
v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547, 557 (3d Cir. 1997)(citing 
Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 
1989)). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts S 908(2) 
(regarding imposition of punitive damages adopted in 
Pennsylvania). 
 
Here, the defendant, a Japanese corporation, (tortious 
actor) defectively manufactured a jet ski in Japan (character 
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of act), the tortious act resulted in the death of a 
Pennsylvania resident while riding the defective jet ski 
(extent of harm caused), and the defendant is a very large 
multi-national corporation (wealth of the defendant). These 
factors indicate Pennsylvania's interest in awarding 
punitive damages to the Calhouns. They also evince Puerto 
Rico's little interest in the outcome of the lawsuit. The fatal 
accident did not occur to a Puerto Rican citizen, the 
plaintiff is not Puerto Rican, the outrageous conduct was 
not committed by a Puerto Rican, and the only connection 
Puerto Rico has is that the accident happened to have 
occurred there. The District Court's reliance on the 
"community purposes of the state in which the tortious 
activity took place" is misplaced, because the"tortious 
activity" at issue in this case -- the allegedly defective 
design and manufacture of the jet ski -- did not occur in 
Puerto Rico. Rather, the jet ski was designed and 
manufactured by a Japanese corporation in Japan. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may 
properly be imposed to further a state's legitimate interests 
in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition. 
See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996). By my analysis, Pennsylvania has a more legitimate 
interest in getting the punitive damages awarded for the 
wrongful death of one of its residents than Puerto Rico has 
in protecting one of its citizens from an excessive verdict by 
precluding the award of punitive damages. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that 
compensation of an injured plaintiff is primarily a concern 
of the state in which the plaintiff is domiciled. Griffith, 203 
A.2d at 806. The only interest of the state of injury would 
be in the compensation of those who rendered medical aid 
and other assistance to the injured parties. Id.  Where, as 
here, immediate death occurs, the state has no such 
interest. Id. at 807. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, Puerto 
Rico has no interest in the compensation of this decedent's 
estate. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has a very strong 
interest in seeing that one of its residents is compensated 
under a wrongful death claim, and that an outrageous and 
tortious act be punished to deter the defendant from 
continuing its behavior. 
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In my view, this result is consistent with Scott v. Eastern 
Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 978 (1968). In Scott, the following contacts were 
crucial to our decision: the decedent was domiciled in 
Pennsylvania; the letters of administration were granted by 
the Register of Wills of Philadelphia County; the decedent's 
personal property was located in Pennsylvania; the 
decedent's relationship with the defendant began in 
Pennsylvania, and the defendant did business in 
Pennsylvania. See 399 F.2d at 22. 
 
The facts in Scott are very similar to the facts here: (1) 
the decedent in Scott was in Boston voluntarily and Natalie 
was in Puerto Rico voluntarily; (2) the decedent in Scott got 
on a plane in Boston voluntarily and Natalie got on the jet- 
ski in Puerto Rico voluntarily; (3) the decedent in Scott was 
killed in Boston and Natalie was killed in Puerto Rico; (4) 
the decedent in Scott was a Pennsylvania resident as was 
Natalie; and (5) the decedent's estate in Scott  was settled in 
Pennsylvania, Natalie's estate is to be settled in 
Pennsylvania, and Yamaha does business in Pennsylvania, 
including advertising and distributing its products. In 
contrast, Puerto Rico's sole contact with the incident in 
question is that Natalie's death occurred in its territorial 
waters. Thus, under the ratio decidendi of Scott, Puerto Rico 
(like Massachusetts in Scott), the state where the accident 
occurred, has no interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
 
In LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069 (3d Cir. 
1996), a Pennsylvania resident was injured at his regular 
workplace in Delaware. In LeJeune the cornerstone of our 
conclusion that Delaware was not a fortuitous place of 
injury, was the fixed location of the plaintiff 's workplace, 
the regularity of his presence there, and the fact that the 
majority of the wrongful conduct occurred in Delaware. 
Neither Scott nor LeJeune defines the concept of fortuity. 
However, as the Calhouns argue and I agree, Natalie's brief 
vacation in Puerto Rico is more akin to that of the plaintiff 
in Scott than to the status of the plaintiff in LeJeune who 
came to Delaware every day to work. 
 
Other Circuits provide some guidance. In airplane crash 
cases, for example, the place of injury is much more 
fortuitous than the place the defendant selects as his place 
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of incorporation and principal place of business or the 
place of misconduct. In In re Air Crash Near Chicago, 644 
F.2d 594, 615 (7th Cir. 1981); cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 
(1981), the court held that the state where an injury occurs 
has less interest in deterrence and less ability to control 
behavior by deterrence or punishment than the state where 
the plaintiff is domiciled or the state where the misconduct 
occurred. In La Plante v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 
27 F.3d 731 (1st Cir. 1994), the court applied Rhode Island 
law to govern a products liability action brought by an army 
mechanic stationed in Colorado against Honda in his home 
state of Rhode Island for injuries sustained in Colorado 
while operating a vehicle designed and manufactured by 
Honda. In rejecting the law of the place of injury, the La 
Plante court gave significant weight to the fact that the 
tortious conduct that gave rise to the plaintiff 's claim 
occurred not in Colorado, but in Japan, where the car was 
designed. Id. at 741. 
 
In Villaman v. Schee, 1994 WL 6661 at *4 (9th Cir. 1994), 
the court held that because Arizona tort law was designed 
in part to deter negligent conduct within its borders, 
Arizona had a stronger interest in the application of its laws 
allowing for full compensatory and punitive damages than 
Mexico did, whose limitation of tort damages, like Puerto 
Rico's, was designed to protect its residents "from excessive 
financial burdens or exaggerated claims." If the defendants 
in this case were Puerto Rican residents, then Puerto Rico's 
interest in protecting its residents from excessivefinancial 
burdens might be somewhat compelling. However, Puerto 
Rico has no resident to protect and I conclude it has no 
interest in denying either punishment or full recovery to 
non-residents. 
 
Although punitive damages may be the medium of 
deterrence, the result and purpose of punitive damages is 
to protect citizens. I would hold that the District Court 
erred by concluding that the Calhouns' punitive damages 
claim is governed by Puerto Rico law. 
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